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The ‘Horse-Meat’ Scandal: Illegal activity in the Food Supply Chain. 
Abstract
Purpose: Food supply chain theory and practice generally assumes that the business 
practices and processes involved are ethical, legal and value adding when this is not always 
so, as demonstrated by the ongoing 2013 Horsemeat Scandal. Although it is ostensibly a 
UK based affair it encompasses the meat processing industry across Europe. We thus 
examine supply chain criminality and highlight ‘scandal scripts’ which amplify underlying 
issues. 
Approach: A systematic review of extant literature on the scandal adds to that body of 
work, updating the existing narrative to include a detailed analysis of ‘convicted ‘industry 
insiders’, highlighting supply chain issues involved in the frauds. Micro-stories of 
businessmen involved are presented to enable an empirical exploration of their illegal 
involvement in the meat trade. Using storied data from accounts of the scandal as 
contemporary examples, emerging themes and issues are outlined through a mixed 
methods qualitative approach consisting of ethical covert research, utilising documentary 
research strategy underpinned by Narrative Inquiry. 
Findings: Media coverage perpetuated various myths notably that the fraud was carried 
out by ‘shadowy’, Eastern European ‘Mafia figures’ exploiting the extended food supply 
chains. The analysis is aided by the use of media hypothesis. Far from being a mafia 
inspired fraud the criminal activity was organized in nature and committed by insider 
businessmen. The findings demonstrate that supply chains are complex and require an 
understanding of storied business practices including the ethical and illegal. 
Research implications: From an academic perspective there are implications such as 
the dearth of academic research and policy-related studies into food fraud possibly because 
of the difficulty in obtaining data because of access to such enterprises and entrepreneurs 
necessitating reliance upon documentary sources and investigative journalism.
Practical implications: There are distinct policy implications particularly the need to 
legislate against international criminal conspiracies and everyday ordinary organized food 
frauds perpetuated.  Lax penalties do little to prevent such crimes which need to be taken 
more seriously by the authorities, and treated as major crime. In formulating food laws, 
rules and regulations, greater cognizance should be taken to consider how supply chains in 
the food industry could be better protected from predatory criminal actions.
Originality: This novel qualitative study will enable academics and practitioners to 
better understand illegal enterprise, food fraud and risk management from both operational 
and supply chain perspectives and will be useful to investigators by furthering our 
understanding of entrepreneurial practice and morality in the food industry. 
Key Words: Ethics: Risk Management: Food fraud; Illegal Food Supply; Illegal 
Enterprise; Abattoir Owners.
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1. Introduction.
There is a growing literature on criminality and food-fraud in the supply chain 
(McElwee, Smith and Lever, 2017). Additionally, in the wake of the Horse-meat scandal 
of 2013 [aka Horsegate] (Premanandh, 2013; Agnoli et al, 2016), and despite an increasing 
literature on food fraud (Shears, 2010; Rouvière, 2012; Manning and Soon, 2016; 
Manning, et al, 2016; Koubová,Samková and Hasonová, 2018) such research seldom 
features in supply chain journals (Oglethorpe and Heron, 2013; Simangunsong, Hendry 
and Stevenson, 2016)    nor in academic literatures on farming, food policy, operations and 
food production management. This is an obvious research gap to be filled. Simultaneously, 
media reports and evidence from official government reports suggest that there has been 
an increase in food related criminal activity since the global financial recession of 2007-08 
(see Smith, 2017; McElwee et al 2017; Fassam and Dani, 2017 for more in-depth 
discussion). 
The commonly held perception of food fraud is that it is committed by organized 
criminal gangs and mafias (as suggested by Lord, Elizondo and Spencer, 2014). This article 
and embedded case studies pushes the boundaries of supply chain management research 
and practice by showing that the meat industry and its supply chains, is as open to 
exploitation and malpractice by criminal gangs as it is to legitimate entrepreneurs. 
However, the majority of those highlighted in this paper are individual businessmen who 
cynically and criminally exploit the meat trade for financial gain. Although these 
individuals purport to sell meat products as genuine through legitimate business channels, 
the evidence from official data such as convictions, indicate that it is criminal fraud. 
Moreover, operationally, these business channels appear to be highly organized. In the 
cases narrated here the majority of firms involved are all registered in the Irish or UK 
‘Companies house’ and appear to operate via an extensive network of legal and illegal 
contacts throughout the UK, Europe and Ireland. Of necessity, our embedded case studies 
focus on the activities of named and convicted businessmen.i The overt inclusion of their 
names is justifiable because it would not be possible to discuss the scandal without using 
the names of the individuals and companies involved. This overt/covert paradigm is 
accepted research practice in qualitative research (Spicker, 2010). 
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The aim of this study, by investigating the scandal, is to demonstrate that supply chain 
theory and value chain analysis can be used to better understand the illegal activities of 
entrepreneurs and businesses as a parallel supply chain. Failures in understanding  the 
nature of food related scandals hinder society from taking appropriate action against 
increasing levels of food fraud. Moreover, there is a need to challenge the ways in which 
supply chain criminality is viewed and to acknowledge the existence of supply chain 
criminality and malpractices. The food industry is a high pressure, high volume, low profit 
business involving a wide range of entrepreneurial actors, including farmers, small 
business owners such as butchers and abattoir owners, independent entrepreneurs, large 
meat processers and supermarkets (McElwee, 2008; Smith and McElwee, 2015). All these 
stakeholders compete to extract profit from a crowded food supply chain.
Food fraud incidents are invariably labelled as scandals.  Elliot (2017) articulates that 
such scandals have an ‘anatomy’ and utilise alternative scripts and explanations to divert 
attention from the real causes of a phenomenon. These scripted explanations also act as 
‘neutralisation techniques’ (Gottschalk and Smith, 2011) to ensure that damage limitation 
is achieved by the person, or company, caught up in a scandal. The storylines of such 
“scandal scripts” have explanatory power and contribute to the creation of “ampiflication 
spirals” and “moral panics” (Cohen, 1972). A scandal is defined as – ’An action or event 
regarded as morally or legally wrong and causing general public outrage’ (Oxford 
Dictionary). In the farming and food industries, it is common to label such cases as scandals 
when they are prime examples of criminal entrepreneurship and endemic supply chain 
malpractices.  
In referring to fraud, we utilise the definition from the provisions stated in UK Fraud 
Act (2006, c.35, 2.): 
 (1) A person is in breach of this section if he (sic)
(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and
(b) intends, by making the representation—
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.
(2) A representation is false if—
(a) it is untrue or misleading, and
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(b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading.
Our overarching research question is straightforward: How can an understanding of 
illegal processes help to reach a more nuanced understanding of how the food supply chain 
operates.  The question is answered by examining the activities of illegal adulteration of 
meat products by industry insiders. Overall, the synthesis of the literature and the empirical 
examination of the cases make a contribution to the logistics, criminology, food fraud and 
food policy literature, as well as providing an interesting example of management theory 
in alternative, non-traditional business settings. This research pushes the boundaries of 
supply chain research and practice, demonstrating international relevance in respect of 
theory and practice whilst contributing by extending supply chain knowledge into the 
illegal domain.
The article is structured as follows. First an account of the food fraud literature in 
relation to supply chain theory is presented before providing a brief summary of the Horse 
and Beef meat market in Europe and the UK. Next, an alternative lens shows how to view 
supply chains by outlining a theoretical model of the Beef industry from producer to 
consumer, termed as from ‘farm to fork’ (Dani, 2015). The methodological approach and 
subsequent data analysis is then presented. An alternative explanation of an unofficial but 
nevertheless ‘real’ illegal supply chain is presented. The article concludes by discussing 
the implications of how the understanding of alternative supply chains discussed can enable 
those charged with crime prevention to restrict offenders in this and other areas.
2. A literature review on food fraud, supply chain theory and Horse-gate.
The focus of this review is the Horse-Meat scandal, involving numerous multi-national 
companies across Europe and the UK and has led to two inquiries: the Scudamore Inquiry 
in Scotland and the Elliot Review in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Both inquiries 
were critical of the UK and European Union’s investigative apparatus.ii This is important 
because illegal meat products entering the mainstream meat market increased after 
Horesegate (Marsden and Morely, 2014; Smith et al, 2015). This review begins with a 
discussion of food fraud before moving on to consider how it is related to criminal 
entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Smith, 2009) in the meat and abattoir sectors. Of 
particular interest are legitimate entrepreneurs who use their insider status to perpetuate 
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organized criminal food frauds (Lord, Elizando and Spencer, 2014). UK markets (both 
legal and illegal) are discussed before concluding with a discussion on supply chain issues 
in the industry. Hitherto,  the food industry and in particular abattoir owners have not been 
subject to serious academic scrutiny in relation to illegal business practices, with the 
exception of animal cruelty issues. Abattoirs, by their very nature are private areas not 
generally open to public view and thus evade scrutiny.
Food Crime and Food Fraud: Food-fraud is a collective term encompassing the 
deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation of food, 
food ingredients, or food packaging; or making false or misleading statements about a 
product for economic gain (see Gallagher and Thomas, 2010; and Spink and Moyer, 2013). 
Food-fraud is an economically motivated crime carried out intentionally alongside 
associated actions to avoid detection by regulatory bodies or consumers (Grundy et al. 
2012). The profits are comparable to those from cocaine trafficking, but with fewer risks 
(Smith and McElwee 2015, McElwee, Smith and Lever, 2017). It is a lucrative crime which 
is unlikely to be detected under normal circumstances. Moreover, the investigation and 
detection of food-fraud in the UK/Europe is hampered by a variety of inter-linked factors.
There has been an evident increase in illegal criminal activity in the farming and food 
industries, where food-fraud is now big business (Gallagher and Thomas, 2010:352).  The 
UK food sector is valued at around £103 billion a year to the UK economy (DEfRA 
2013:10). The literature on food fraud generally portrays the industry as victims of 
‘predatory’ criminal gangs (Lord, et al, 2014). Seldom is the role of industry insiders or 
rogue-farmers considered (see Smith 2004; and Smith and McElwee, 2013 for a discussion 
of crimes where industry specific knowledge is needed). 
Ostensibly, the meat industry is a continuation of the farming industry and many abattoir 
owners have experience of farming. There are however, a few reports which provide a 
sketchy coverage of criminal activity in the meat industry including studies into the 
activities of businessmen involved in Police operations Aberdeen and Fox (Haslam, 
Undated). Smith et al (2015) illustrate that during the last two decades in the UK there have 
been several high profile food-fraud cases, the Halal Meat Scandal (Smith, 2004); the 
Eurovet Scandal (Smith and Whiting, 2013); and the Black-Fish-Scandal (Smith, 2015).iii 
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In all cases the business owners involved were prosecuted using lesser legislative acts than 
fraud and each investigation, although started by a government agency, was taken over by 
the police because of their proven investigative ability (Smith et al, 2015). Nevertheless, 
despite the existence of such high profile cases, little consideration is given to insider 
knowledge and criminal complicity (Lord et al, 2014). 
Supply chain criminality: Prior to the last decade criminality in supply chain 
management research was an under researched phenomenon. However, of late there has 
been a growth in interest in the topic: Gaonker (2004) on frameworks for determining risks 
and solutions at a strategic, operational and tactical level; Finch (2004) and Asbjørnslett 
(2009) on risk management; Smith (2004) and Smith and McElwee (2016) on the supply 
chain side of the illegal smokies trade; Oglethorpe and Heron (2013) in relation to 
observable operational and supply chain barriers and constraints; Basu (2014) on the 
economics of illicit supply chain activity including concealment and corruption; Smith 
(2015) on the illegal fish supply chain; McElwee, et al (2017) on the illegal halal trade in 
the UK; Simangunsung et al (2016) on collusion in the supply chain; Manning, et al 
(2016) on a typology of criminals in the food supply chain; Smith and McElwee (2016) 
on the theft of tractors for sale abroad; Smith (2017) on the theft of sheep; Gold, Trautrims 
and Trodd (2015), New (2015), and Stevenson and Cole (2018) in relation to human 
trafficking; Fox, et al. (2018) on seafood supply chain fraud; and Soon et al (2019) relating 
to ‘pinch-points’ in the food supply chain. It is if note that these examples of supply chain 
criminality involve business processes and practices making them of interest to supply 
chain scholars and practitioners.
A major theme of these studies relates to  parallel legal and illegal supply chains and 
crossover points, or antagonistic gateways between legal and illegal logistics systems from 
a supply chain perspective causing Finch (2004) to opine that organized theft is a crisis in 
modern day supply chains. Another emerging theme is that of the increasing complexity 
and length of supply chains and their exposure to vulnerability and criminal acts within a 
complex global marketplace (Asbjørnslett, 2009). To handle the unforeseen consequences 
of this complexity there are two main approaches: (1) design supply chains with built in 
risk-tolerance and; (2) contain the damage once the undesirable event has occurred. 
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Nevertheless, both approaches require a clear understanding of the potential for such events 
to occur as well as the associated consequences and impacts of these events. Moreover, as 
stated much of the the literature treats the business and the supply chain as the victim of 
outside perpetrators, not as a platform for insider fraud (Lord, et al, 2014). These themes 
are particulary relevant to the horsemeat scandal.  Of course, short supply chains may 
minimalise the opportunities for fraud with the added benefits of reducing food miles and 
reducing carbon footprints whilst simultaneously adding value at local and regional levels.
There are numerous business processes and other issues including barriers and 
constraints which facilitate supply chain criminality. Oglethorpe and Heron (2013) 
researched the observable operational and supply chain barriers and constraints that 
occur in local food supply chains in the UK concentrating on smaller producers who 
seek to increase market penetration across a wider geographic area. They drafted an 
empirical supply chain map and explanatory narrative which records the burdens and 
impacts occurring in local food supply chains. This identified seven broad categories 
of constraint type: constraints due to the nature of the market; due to scale and the 
nature of products; constraints related to employment and skills; institutional 
constraints; constraints in supply chain relationships; certification, policy and 
regulatory constraints; and constraints around personal beliefs and anthropomorphism. 
It is of note that they did not directly consider criminal intent. Furthermore, 
Simangunsung et al (2016) argue that the implementation of a joint purchasing 
mechanism is a key strategy for combatting collusion amongst suppliers. 
Simangunsung et al empirically investigate the effective management strategies for 14 
sources of supply chain uncertainty, with an emphasis on uncertainties or strategies 
that involve ethical issues. They highlight numerous issues, such as evidence of 
collusion amongst suppliers, to rationing of supplies and increase in prices; unethical 
influences on government policy; and “abuse” of power by large retailers at the 
expense of smaller competitors. These issues are germane to most countries. As well 
as having implications for customers and suppliers these are lessons to be learned by 
the authorities and fraud investigators. 
Academic literature on the Horse-meat scandal.
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There is a paucity of academic articles relating specifically to the scandal and those that 
are in print tend to be descriptive in nature, acting as commentaries, rather than deeper 
level analyses. One plausible explanation for this is the slowness of the official response 
and of the investigations into the scandal, combined with the international element and 
complex nature of the frauds. There is no unifying theme in the academic articles to date. 
One of the first academic articles was a review of regulations relating to Romania and a 
commentary on the Romanian government’s efforts to combat food fraud (Stanciu, 
Dumitrascu, et al, 2013). Premanandh (2013) in reviewing the press and media content in 
relation to the incidences of food mis-description and adulteration argues that the scandal 
and the ‘authenticity concerns’ arising from it was a ‘wake-up-call’ to the regulatory 
authorities. Premanandh highlights the role of the regulatory authorities in circumventing 
the issues relating to meat authenticity including science based technological solutions to 
combat fraud and/or accidental mislabeling. Premanandh calls for a greater need for 
collective action by continuous monitoring schemes; along with improved detection 
methodologies and stringent regulation on defaulters to minimize or eliminate 
authentication problems. 
In acknowledging the academic and journalistic investigations/lay debates into the 
scandal, Abbots and Coles (2013) argue that the articulation of food fraud is inherently 
problematic because the debates surrounding them are invariably labelled as scandals, 
moral panics and crises; and also because the supply chain systems themselves are 
unstable. Within the debates, particular types of consumers (typically poor and working 
class); particular types of producers (Agri-industrial food busin sses); and particular types 
of retailers (“budget” and “corporate” supermarkets) are vilified.  Using Horsegate as a 
case study they unpacked and disentangled these discourses of food and found that “what 
is wrong with food” is less related to its systems of provision, but more in the ways its 
various agents are discursively cast and subsequently moralized as perpetrators of a 
globalized and industrial food system.iv Madichie and Yamoah (2016), argue that the root 
cause of the scandal is a power asymmetry imbalance in the food supply chain between 
major suppliers (including supermarkets) and farmers and that imbalance may have 
contributed to a supplier culture that tolerated the unethical decision making leading to the 
scandal. 
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In addition, Ibrahim and Howarth (2015) argue that the vilification of shadowy Eastern 
European mafia figures resulted from stereotypical notions of otherness. In a subsequent 
paper, Ibrahim and Howarth (2016) argue that the media framed the 2013 scandal by fusing 
discourses beyond the politics of food. They identifify three recurrent media frames and 
dom nant discourses which converge with wider political debates and cultural stereotypes 
in circulation in the media around immigration and intertextual discourse on historical food 
scandals. They find that Horsegate gave rise to affective media debates and frames which 
invoked fear of the other (horse meat and the supposed mafias who supply it) and the 
transgression of a sacred British identity, often juxtaposing ‘Britishness’ with a constructed 
and alien ‘Otherness’. 
3. Methodological Approach. 
Empirical data, primarily documentary sources on the scandal, i.e. press and media 
material were accessed (Scott, 2006), supplemented by a systematic review of academic 
publications on the scandal. Through a process of immersion (Borkan, 1999; Ellingson, 
2009) relevant material was assembled. Immersion as a process permits researchers to 
submerge themselves in their collected data by experiencing, reading or examining some 
portion of the data in greater detail. The data was authenticated by writing it up using 
“Narrative Inquiry” techniques (Clandinin and Huber, 2010; Hunter et al, 2014). From this 
data, micro-stories of the insider activities of businessmen involved in the scandal were 
developed. This ‘dual processes’ (Borkan, 1999) emerged over time, framing the synthesis 
of the individual stories, vignettes and data to make sense of this illegal trade and activity. 
The meaningful data processed was subsequently articulated a sustainable thesis (Borkan, 
1999) against which the working emperical hypothesis - “That the criminal activities of the 
businessmen involved in the scandal are examples of fraudulent insider criminal activity 
and not predatory organized criminal activity committed by outsiders” was tested. 
Additional hypotheses were developed (see below) from the media reporting of the scandal 
to illustrate the scale of the organized criminal conspiracy, thus evidencing that the scandal 
was not perpetuated on the industry from outside but from within.  
The inquiries were consolidated and organized into a spreadsheet database following 
the acknowledged investigative processes of collecting, reviewing and collating data by 
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number allocation. From this database of insider criminals, we created a master file, 
making connections, uncovering themes across and between stories, articles and other 
forms of data. Subsequently a process of initiating, diversifying, focusing and refocusing 
that the ‘seeing of connections’ before reviewing and regrouping the data to make more 
sense of the stories. These cases or micro-stories (Yin, 2010) provided a narrative order 
underpinned by  a chronology of events and narrated through a continuing story.  
4. Documenting the Horse-meat Scandal.  
In the UK, the slaughter or sale of horses and horse meat is not illegal provided that it 
is correctly labelled as such. Although, the horsemeat industry in Europe is a thriving one, 
in the UK, horsemeat is considered a taboo meat for cultural and historical reasons. The 
scandal began in late 2012, early 2013 when the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) 
which oversees the implementation of food safety controls in Ireland (set out in Irish and 
EU laws) conducted a two month long investigation into the authenticity of beef products 
which culminated in the publication of a report which highlighted the presence of 
horsemeat in in a frozen burger produced in Ireland (O’Mahony, 2013). This report 
triggered a pan European food fraud-scandal with regulatory implications relating to how 
the industry will be regulated in the future. The fraud caught many within the industry 
unawares because the industry was regarded as being already highly regulated. The issues 
raised related to the complexity of the food supply chain, traceability issues and the need 
for DNA based testing within the industry to be more common. The report was highlighted 
in the press triggering the scandal.
Documentary Sources: The narrative chronology of Horsegate can best be pieced 
together from the primary documentary evidence (Scott, 2006) from press and media 
articles because there has been no definitive academic analysis or synthesis of the material 
relating to the scandal to date. The scandal initiated a continuing debate in the UK Press. 
The purpose of this section is to document salient points of the scandal, not to provide an 
in depth and exhaustive account. For more detail, see (Lawrence, 2013) and (Lawrence, et 
al, 2013). A major aspect of early articles was that of disbelief and shock that such a fraud 
could be perpetuated (Woods, 2013). A feature of the general tone of the debates 
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surrounding the scandal were that they were set by the UK and Irish Press focusing upon 
the cultural abhorrence against eating horse meat. In other European media outlets the 
scandal was initially seen as being a ‘parochial’ one. However, in reality the adulteration 
was a global problem (O’Mahony, 2013) which spanned the EU. The scale of the scandal 
was quickly uncovered by the efforts of the investigative journalists involved. It 
subsequently spread from the UK and Ireland to Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, 
Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, Belgium, The Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, 
Switzerland, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Cyprus and Hong Kong. The ensuing debate 
gave rise to various media hypothesis, including:-
 Media hypothesis 1 – It was an International – Pan European Fraud / Conspiracy 
(Lawrence, 2013).
 Media hypothesis 2 -  ‘Shadowy’, Polish, Eastern European and Italian mafia 
gangs were to blame (Doward, 2013; Lichfield, Randall and Sanchez, 2013; Kelly, 2013).
 Media hypothesis 3 – It was a result of a lack of regulation, deregulation and cuts 
in numbers of inspectors (Hutton, 2012; Taylor and Meikle, 2013; Carrington, 2013).
 Media hypothesis 4 – That Supermarket chains were complicit by failing to check 
meat suppliers and by imposing unreasonable cost structures for suppliers to fit their 
economic model (Mason, 2013; Bennett, 2013).
 Media hypothesis 5 – The complexity of the food supply chains were to blame 
(Lawrence, Allen and Scruton, 2013).
 Media hypothesis 6 – UK customers were complicit themselves by demanding 
cheap ready-made meals (Craven, 2013).
The scandal caused major reputational damage to food companies including European 
household names e.g. Burger King, Tesco, ASDA, ALDI, LIDL, IKEA, Co-op, Nestle, 
Prima, Picard, Comigel, Silvercrest and Findus (King and Buckley, 2013; Neville, 2013; 
Williams, 2013; Neate and Moulds, 2013) leading to huge financial losses. As a 
consequence, many consumers lost confidence in their national food supply systems. This 
journalastic investigation highlighted the countries and companies involved and the 
complexity of the supply chains and the sheer number of companies in the supply chain.v 
Each company issued press releases either denying knowledge or an intention to deal with 
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the resultant PR and financial crisis. None of the major food companies, suppliers nor 
supermarkets were implicated in wrong doing and the official focus of the inquiries in all 
countries were on the food processors. A list of suspect companies is presented in table 1:
 
Suspect Companies Reason for suspicion
ABP Food Group Ireland – 
owned by Larry Goodman and 
consisting of 4 subsidiaries 
Silvercrest; Dalepack; Fresh link; and 
Dairy Crest
Silvercrest was identified as the first source of the scandal. 
Although no charges were ever brought Tesco dropped them as 
a supplier and Tesco, COOP, ALDI and Makro dropped 
Dalepack products. The company blamed rogue managers for 
buying meat from another Irish trader and sacked them. 
Silvercrest later went out of business.
Spanghero – a French Company. 
It had a holding company Poujol 
which bought the meat from Romania. 
The French government reported that Spanghero knowingly 
sold horsemeat mislabeled as beef and falsified documents. The 
authorities suspended their licence. Links to Comigel and Draap. 
Arrests were made of 21 people in France in December 2013. In 
2019 four accused including Jan Fasan went on trial in Paris in 
conncetion with the Spanghero and Comigel cases (see below).
Comigel – a French Company. 
Owner - Erik Lehagre. 
Found to be complicit by French authorities and bought 
contaminated meat from Spanghero. Staff at Comigel were 
blamed for not noticing anomalies in paper work. Dropped by 
Findus as suppliers. Links to Spanghero and Draap.
Draap – Dutch company owned 
by Jan Fasan. 
Draap is a reversal of the Dutch word Paard which means 
horse. Fasan had previously been convicted of horsemeat fraud 
in 2007 and the company is registered in Cyprus. 
Wiljo Import en Export BV – 
owned by Willy Selton.
Selton was implicated by the Dutch authorities and was the 
first accused to be arrested in May 2013.
Calderdale meats, Todmorden, 
Yorkshire, owned by Peter Boddy 
and managed by David Moss.
The company was named as a supplier of horse meat in the 
Irish inquiry. Boddy and Moss were arrested on 14.2.2014.
Farm Box Meats, Abersytwith, 
Wales owned by Dafydd Raw-Rees 
and managed by Patterson. 
The company was named as a supplier of horse meat in the 
Irish inquiry. The pair were arrested on 14.2.2014.
Andronicos Sideras of Dinos & 
sons, City of London and  Ulrik 
Neilsen of Gentofte, Denmark owner 
of the Danish Company Flexifoods 
and Alex Beech, manager at the 
Flexifoods plant in Hull, UK.
The company was named as a supplier of horse meat in the 
Irish inquiry. Alleged links to Jan Fasen.
Andronicos Sideras, 55, was sentenced to four and a half 
years, while his co-conspirator, 58-year-old Ulrik Nielsen, was 
jailed for three and a half years 
Table 1 – List of Suspect Companies.
Table 1 provides detail of the cases discussed but is not a definitive list of companies 
nor people involved. Several other cases encountered are not included because 
prosecutions were discontinued. The press and media coverage continued throughout 2013 
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to the present date as investigations unfold. The general tone of the articles was critical of 
the slow and frustrating progress made by authorities in the individual countries with 
interdicting the alleged offenders involved in the scandal. Press and media articles relating 
to the investigations and convictions of the accused are further discussed below as micro-
stories.   
Official Reports and investigations: The Irish investigation led by Professor Alan 
Reilly of the FSAI confirmed the presence of horsemeat in the samples tested and asked 
for an official investigation.  The ‘investigation’ by Ireland’s Department of Agriculture, 
quickly published its findings in March 2013 concluding that there was no evidence that 
Silvercrest knowingly purchased horsemeat, thereby closing off the Irish investigation.vi 
In the UK, a House of Commons Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs report expressed concern that horsemeat contamination resulted from fraud and 
other criminal activity committed across the European Union. It evidenced a complex 
network of companies trading in and mislabelling beef/beef products which is both 
fraudulent and illegal. The UK and Scottish Governments also initiated Inquiries into the 
scandal. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland the Inquiry was led by Professor Chris 
Elliot and the subsequent report became known as the Elliot Review (Elliot, 2014). Elliott 
was commissioned by the UK government to conduct an independent review of the UK 
food supply system to determine what had gone wrong and to suggest measures to make 
the system much more robust from fraud. Elliott made eight major recommendations to the 
UK government/food industry about how to deal with the serious issues of criminality in 
the UK food system. The report detailed a systems approach to food crime prevention 
particularly in relation to how advances in analytical science can help combat food fraud. 
In Scotland a separate inquiry by Lord Scudamore produced similar findings (Scudamore, 
2015). Both Inquiries highlighted that the scandal was a food fraud perpetuated from within 
the industry and resulted in changes to their respective Food Standards Agencies 
Investigative structures and procedures.  
5. Findings / Results.
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The gap or lacuna in the literature on criminality in the food supply chain is driven by 
the binary assumption relating to the belief that criminality within the food supply chain is 
perpetuated by predatory criminals operating from outside the supply chain (Lord et al, 
2014) when in reality it is only logical to consider that in some instances, insider 
involvement may be in play. Thus, the literature appears to support the assumption of the 
outsider thesis. Consequentially, one must always consider the possibility of the 
insider/outsider dichotomy holistically. Additionally, the extant literature on food fraud 
appears to implicitly consider supply chain criminality and risk management from an 
insider perspective.  However, the emerging literature on supply chain criminality and risk 
management is beginning to challenge this position by considering the involvement of 
predatory industry insiders. Moreover, the media hypothesis discussed above also appear 
to support the outsider thesis as argued below. For example, media hypothesis 1 that the 
horsemeat scandal was an international Pan European Food Conspiracy when taken into 
consideration along with media hypothesis 2 relating to the involvement of shadowy Mafia 
figures also supports the thesis by lending credence to it. This position overshadowed 
media hypothesis 3, 4 and 6 relating to the lack of regulation and the complicity of super 
market chains. Also Media hypothesis 5 relating to the complexity of the frauds appeared 
to serve the purpose of excusing the authorities  from any blame. It is surely of note that 
the media hypothesis formulated did not even consider the possibility of insider 
involvement in the crimes. From an analysis of the documentary evidence it becomes 
evident that the rhetoric used by the media and authorities and in particular the focus on 
‘rotten apple’ thesis and on rogue managers and rogue traders dilutes the presence of the 
insider criminal from the equation. It took an extended period of time from 2013 to 2019 
(6 years) in which time patient investigation tested in the criminal justice system and a 
more in-depth investigative journalism process to uncover the insider involvement and thus 
highlight the theoretical importance of consider the insider / outsider dichotomy in full. 
Defense claims of poor management - not criminality also served to obfuscate the matter. 
One of the main findings relate to the complexity of the meat supply chain and the 
number of countries, agencies and stakeholders involved. From the analysis we identified 
numerous stakeholders who play a part in the process. See figure 1 for a visual 
representation:-
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Insert figure 1 here
We identify two basic supply chain types – localised and extended. Figure 2, models 
and illustrates the fraud, demonstrating the complexity of the horsemeat supply chain. The 
figure illustrates the layered complexities of extended supply chains involving other EU 
and non-EU countries taking into cognisance the different types of dealers and individuals 
involved and also factors in the aspects of illicit, illegal and criminal involvement in the 
trade. It is not an exhaustive diagram because it does not factor in the different political, 
legal, legislative nor local differences in institutions and structures involved. There will 
always be players involved of whom little is known so the models built can only be 
tentative. For example, before ‘Horsegate’ the authorities and the public did not suspect 
that the meat supply chain was being adulterated with horse meat. 
Insert figure 2 here
Presenting the case stories.
This section narrates the micro-stories of those investigated as a result of the scandal 
and discusses the nuances of the cases analysed  before reporting on the findings. Table 2, 
presents the individual micro-stories, chronologically as the prosecutions occurred 
illustrating the linkages to associated companies and sentences imposed. 
Accused/Companies 
Involved
Narrative chronology and micro-story Sentence/Fines
Wiljo Import en Export 
BV – Dutch company owned 
by Willy Selton.
Selton was implicated by the Dutch authorities 
and was the first accused to be arrested in May 2013 
and prosecuted.
Selton was sentenced 
to 2 and a half years. He 
was declared bankrupt 
facing damages claims 
of 11 million euros 
($12m; £8m)vii.
Draap – Dutch company 
owned by Jan Fasan and 
registered in Cyprus.viii
Fasan described as millionaire meat trader had 
previously been convicted of horsemeat fraud in 
2007 in an American scandal. He received a six-
month suspended sentence and a $50,000 fine. He 
was convicted in 2012 for a south American 
horsemeat fraud and arrested in 2013 for questioning 
with respect to the activities of Draap who supplied 
Comigel and Spanghero. He denied the offences. He 
was later arrested in France in 2014 and charged with 
fraud. In 2017 he was again arrested for offences 
arising out of the scandal and for a new horsemeat 
fraud. In 2017 it was reported that he masterminded 
In 2012 Fasan and 
his manager Hendricus 
Windmeijer were 
convicted of food 
adulteration offences in 
respect of their 
involvement. The main 
case is still under 
investigation and as such 
is sub-judice. His 
holding company is in 
Cyprus where banking 
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a new fraud where his gang stole domestic and sick 
horses across Europe (Belgium, Italy, Romania, The 
Netherlands, France and Spain) and passed them off 
as farmed horses. Seventy five people were arrested 
across Spain and charged with fraud, theft, forgery, 
criminal organization and money laundering.ix At 
the time of writing he is facing prosecution for his 
involvement in the Spanghero and Comigel cases. 
details are private. 
Spanghero –  French 
Company.
The French government reported that Spanghero 
knowingly sold horsemeat mislabelled as beef and 
falsified documents. The authorities suspended their 
licence. Links to Comigel and Draap. Arrests were 
made of 21 people in France in December 2013 and 
in 2019 Jan Fasan and three other co-accused from 
Spanghero went on trial.x
Four accused  –  were 
found guilty in 2019 – 
Jacques Poujol the 
owner; his manager 
Patrice Monguillon, Jan 
Fasan and his business 
partner Hendricus 
Windmeijer. Poujol was 
sentenced to two years in 
jail and had his homeme 
and 100,000 euros 
confiscated; and the 
Spanghero manager 
Patrice Monguillon 
received a 1 year 
suspended sentence. Jan 
Fasan received a 2 year 
sentence and his 
manager Hendricus 
Windmeijer was also 
given a 1 year suspended 
sentencexi.
Comigel –  French 
Company. Owner - Erik 
Lehagre.
Found to be complicit by French authorities and 
bought contaminated meat from Spanghero. Staff at 
Comigel were blamed for not noticing anomalies in 
paper work. See narrative above in relation to 
Spanghero who were held to have supplied Comigel 
with the meat.
Case still 
underinvestigation.
Calderdale meats, 
Todmorden, Yorkshire owned 
by Peter Boddy and managed 
by David Moss.xii 
Boddy and Moss were arrested on 14.2.2014 in a 
joint operation between the FSA and police. Moss 
admitted falsifying invoices / paperwork. Both 
blamed the shambolic record keeping which meant 
that the sources and destinations of horses could not 
be proven.
Boddy pled guilty to 
failing to abide by EU 
Meat traceability rules 
over 17 horses and of 
failing to keep records of 
s les of 50 horses. Moss 
admitted forging 
invoices regarding the 
sale of horsemeat. 
Boddy was fined £8000. 
Moss received a 
suspended 4 month 
prison sentence. They 
were ordered to pay 
£10,000 legal costs.
Farm Box Meats, 
Abersytwith, Wales, owned 
by Dafydd Raw-Rees and 
Raw-Rees and Patterson were arrested on 
14.2.2014 in a joint operation between the FSA and 
police. Investigators found goat meat falsely labelled 
Patterson pled guilty 
to 17 counts of falsely 
mislabeling goat as 
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managed by Colin 
Patterson.xiii
as lamb. Information received that the firm were 
supplying horsemeat could not be proven and the 
two accused were not charged with horsemeat 
offences. The pair initially denied the offences and 
used neutralisation tactics to avoid criminal blame. 
Raw-Rees claimed to be a silent partner with little 
daily contact with the business, whilst Patterson 
denied knowing the difference between goat and 
sheep carcasses. Patterson also blamed his poor book 
keeping abilities and the lack of an adequate 
recording system. The company’s books were 
described by prosecutors as being a ‘shambles’. The 
duo had multiple Directorships of several other 
companies many of which went into liquidation. 
This could be an evasion tactic. The company went 
into administration with losses of over £1 million. It 
is not known if the directors have started up in the 
business again.
lamb. He was sentenced 
to a 12 week sentence 
suspended for 2 years. 
Raw-Rees pled guilty to 
one count of failing to 
comply with EU 
traceability rules and one 
count of falsely 
describing food. 
Andronicos Sideras 
director of Dinos & sons, 
City of London. Ulrik 
Neilsen of Gentofte, Denmark 
owner of the Danish 
Company Flexifoods and 
Alex Beech, manager at the 
Flexifoods plant in Hull, 
UK.xiv
Sideras who has links to Cyprus was accused of 
a fraud / conspiracy in 2012 by passing off 
horsemeat as beef. Large shipments of poor quality 
‘trim’ passed legally through various companies 
before being criminally adulterated to pass off as 
genuine beef. The prosecution proved a tissue of lies 
and deception motivated by greed. Falsified 
paperwork created a false provenance for the 
adulterated meat. During searches of Flexifoods 
premises in Denmark and the UK emails and 
documents proving the conspiracy to defraud were 
located which detailed how the paperwork was 
falsified. Sideras was found to have also created 
false paperwork and falsified health certificates, 
destroying emails to cover the deception. His 
fingerprints were found on falsified labels. Sideras 
pled not guilty claiming he was only storing the meat 
for Flexifoods and that the mislabeling was a 
genuine mistake after pallets of food were damaged 
in transit. This evidences the use of neutralization 
tactics. The official cost of the fraud was cited as 
£177,869 but it is estimated that it may have netted 
over a million £’s.  
Neilsen and Beech 
pled guilty. Neilsen was 
convicted of one charge 
of conspiracy to defraud 
and sentenced to 3½ 
years. Beech received a 
short suspended 
sentence. Sideras pled 
not guilty but was 
convicted of one charge 
of conspiracy to defraud 
and sentenced to 4 and a 
half years imprisonment.
Table 2 - The individual micro-stories with case details.
Understanding the scripted anatomy of the scandal. 
In addition, the press coverage led to a number of identifiable outcomes which we argue 
result from a scripted ‘Amplification Spiral’ (Cohen, 1972). Firstly, journalists express 
outrage and start a moral panic before moving on to other stories. Secondly, politicians get 
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exposure and sound bites and vilify the perpetrators as shadowy criminals (not 
shady business figures), or the more astute commentators, for example in Ireland and 
Poland acknowledge flaws but distance their country from the scandal. As a result, ouraged 
customers boycott products or supermarkets temporarily and take to social media. They 
quickly return to their original shopping habits. To counteract financial and reputational 
damage the supermarkets engage in damage limitation and issue apologies and denials of 
knowledge. They remove the product from the shelves or ban it whilst dropping the 
supplier from their lists and publically issue press releases citing financial and reputational 
damage and portraying themselves as victims. Most survive the scandal. Simultaneously, 
supply chain companies go into denial mode and issue disclaimers relating to practices or 
the more disreputable outright deny it until it blows over. If the scandal does not abate, the 
investigating authorities investigate invariably proceeding at a slow pace. Statistically, few 
court cases result. Whilst this script is unravelling the accused hide behind claims of bad 
record keeping, or claim to be poor businessmen. They blame a manager or themselves for 
not managing the business properly, claim mistakes and errors to distance themselves from 
blame or may cite personal or health issues for their lapse. International Investigations take 
years to complete and there is a high attrition rate. There are simply too many agencies 
involved with staff who possess different levels of investigatory skills. Few accused ever 
reach the courts and traditionally even less are convicted. Those that are usually receive 
low monetary fines, albeit this research has revealed that the thorough horsemeat 
investigations’ and trials are reversing this trend with jail sentences being issued and higher 
monetary fines imposed. Journalists repeatedly revisit the scandal to report on 
developments Moreover, it is apparent that supermarkets and multi-national corporations 
use public relations techniques to survive scandals whilst genuine businessmen, caught up 
in scandals, may suffer reputational and financial loss. Many resign from the board and 
bankruptcy and ruination may follow on from an entrepreneurial exit (Smith and McElwee, 
2011).  Conversely, ‘Dodgy Businessmen’ simply change the company name and register 
new directors conducting business as usual with a new trade name. This enables them to 
continue trading unabated whilst Mafia and organized crime remain scapegoats. 
It is evident that “Horsegate” was an international – Pan European Fraud thus proving 
media hypothesis 1. An analysis of the empirical material above reveals that far from being 
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a mafia inspired fraud it is organized criminal activity committed by businessmen and 
industry insiders (Lord et al, 2014). However, just because there is no evidence, we cannot 
discount the possibility. It also disproves media hypothesis 2. A lack of regulation, 
deregulation and cuts exacerbated the scandal proving media hypothesis 3.  There is no 
evidence to substantiate media hypothesis 4 that the supermarkets were complicit, nor 
media hypothesis 6 that the UK customers were complicit. This points to an imbalance  and 
power asymmetry between small and major companies as suggested by Madachie and 
Yamoah (2016). The stories evidence the complexity of the extended food supply chains. 
In all cases greed in the pursuit of profit was cited as the main feature of the prosecutions. 
The price differential between the low cost of horsemeat and the high cost of beef made 
the adulteration lucrative and ensured that those involved could compete better against 
more honest competitors. What can also be seen is that the financial costs of being 
successfully prosecuted to the defendants are comparatively very low. In all the cases the 
burden of proof in terms of the acts being fraudulent were met in that the accused all 
knowingly and dishonestly made a false representation to gain benefit for selves and others 
thus proving the empirical hypothesis “That the criminal activities of the businessmen 
involved in the scandal are examples of fraudulent insider criminal activity and not 
predatory organized criminal activity committed by outsiders”. Indeed, the frauds were 
committed within the meat industry by ostensibly otherwise trusted businessmen and with 
the exception of Fasan none of the individuals appear to have been on police, customs nor 
FSA databases. This makes detection difficult and points to a need for a more integrated 
approach to intelligence gathering in relation to business crime, particularly by insiders. It 
is also of significance that the crimes were committed through and facilitated by 
entrepreneurial business practices in the supply chain in contrast to extant supply chain 
theory and literature which normally treats crime as an exogenous event (Lord et al, 2014). 
This needs to change to reflect the presence of insider criminals.    
We argue that the term ‘scandal’ is over-used to describe and excuse criminal greed and 
poor management practices that pervade the food industry. Short-term outrage is often 
forgotten as the headlines move on. Journalists and academics ‘document’ it but move on 
to other stories. As the scandal unfolds it triggers the well-rehearsed actions of those 
involved and this initiates well scripted performance which must be challenged or accepted 
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by those involved. This iterative process sets up a socially constructed and enacted  
‘Amplification Spiral’. However, it is more than a ‘scandal’ because it is an endemic aspect 
of criminal supply chain practice and also of the inevitable aspect of entrepreneurial 
cognition and behaviour whereby if there is money to be made then there will be a taker. 
The above analysis and discussion also addresses the overarching research question – 
“How can value chains be utilised to include illegal processes and develop a more nuanced 
understanding of illegal enterprise? It does so by considering illegal value streams and 
parallel illegal supply chain practices. Our main finding and takeaway message is that there 
is a need for a change in the way supply chain criminality is regarded and to challenge this 
by acknowledging the reality of supply chain criminality and malpractices. Our continuing 
academic interest lies is in moving beyond documenting practices to better understand the 
business processes and practices involved. 
From an operational supply chain perspective a deeper analysis of the synopsis, micro 
stories and the anecdotal evidence provided led us to articulate the following observations. 
All the micro-stories discussed above involve a moral as well as a legal element in that 
they involve the deliberate use of deception by lying and cheating (Green, 2006) across the 
supply chain at different nodal points and legal jurisdictions. Thus whilst much of the 
illegal horsemeat products used in the adulteration may have originated in Romania or 
other European countriesthe frauds were only made possible by the collusion or connivance 
of criminal businessmen and the lax nature of legal procedures adopted by otherwise legal 
food processing businesses. This invatiably entailed the falsification of documentation and 
the collusion of owners and managers within otherwise respected processing businesses. 
At present no single Food Standards body or authority could have interceded at an earlier 
stage in the supply chain  at each individual nodal point to stop the fraud. Only the inception 
of a European wide organisation adopting a multi-agency approach could achieve 
interdictions at an earlier stage of the process. Also, in all the scenarios the legal approach 
has always been retrospective and there is a pressing need for a more proactive approach 
to tackling the food fraud epidemic. An intelligence led proactive strategy is clearly 
required. The analysis and discussion above makes a contribution to the Operational 
Supply Chain management literature by considering illegal processes and the moral as well 
as illegal elements of food fraud and by the inclusion of a conceptual model which leads 
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to the further hypothesis that insider involvement is usually necessary for such a 
widespread fraud to be perpetuated. 
Finally, in relation to the development of a theory of insider involvement in supply chain 
criminality the fact that such a factor was not even considered by the media and initially 
by the authorities  mitigated against the development of a credible explanation – thus even 
adopting Whetton’s (1989) framework of What and How could not have led to linking 
insider involvement to the crimes and in fact prevented the development of a credible and 
logical assumption from which the Why element could be addressed i.e. that one could 
build  logical, credible and compelling arguments to fully explain the nature of the crimes. 
Had insider involvement been considered it is inevitable that insider involvement must 
have been present at the outset of the scandal. The fact that insider involvement was not 
considered prevented us from addressing Whetton’s fourth element of Who, Where, and 
When – the contextual factors from being properly assessed at the time. It took patient 
investigation to understand the context that to commit the frauds one had to have insider 
knowledge. This allowed a full theoretical explanation to evolve over time. From a theory 
building perspective the new contextual evidence allows us to address the three pillars of 
Whetton’s theory development process by elucidating what is new and addressing the so 
what and why so questions. The involvement of insiders provides a powerful theoretical 
explanation.    
6.  Conclusions. 
This study demonstrates international relevance and its global impact (Both 
theoretically and practically) whilst narrating a compelling story that will enable 
investigators to better understand illegal enterprise and food fraud from a supply chain 
perspective and more adequately address the concerns stated in the UK Fraud Act, 2006. 
This study extends supply chain knowledge beyond the usual dyadic perspective. The 
results demonstrate that illegal supply chain practices are a multi-faceted concept that 
requires an understanding of media driven scandals, scandal-scripts, as well as business 
practices and processes alongside a multi-agency approach to enterprise orientated crime. 
This study thus demonstrates how contemporary Supply Chain practices must be integrated 
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in nature and responsive to contemporary information driven issues and  at the same time 
be proactive. Our approach suggests that supply chains can be analysed in order to 
understand illegal processes in addition to conventional legal processes. We illustrate 
examples of criminal-entrepreneurship which although productive and profitable for the 
criminal entrepreneurs exploiting food supply chains is nevertheless unproductive and 
potentially destructive to society in a Baumolian sense.xv We make an incremental 
contribution to theory (see Eisenhardt, 1991 and Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) by 
analysing, reflecting and theorising on the narratives of supply chain criminals and by 
challenging and extending existing knowledge (Whetton, 1987: Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007) and by building a descriptive explanatory model. We establish a contribution by 
virtue of the novelty and originality of our topic grounded in extant supply chain literature 
and because it extends upon accepted knowledge by including and recognising the 
importance of scandal scripts. Our work fills a gap in the extant literature by addressing an 
obvious lacuna in the literature in terms of both incompleteness and inadequacy (Locke 
and Golden-Biddle, 1997). In particular we contribute to an emergent theory of supply 
chain criminality by providing documentary evidence of it existance.
We argue that one must work from the presumption that there will inevitably be illegal 
process involved in the food supply chain. It is only by understanding such illegal processes 
that work towards interdicting and excluding such illegal processes can be made. This work 
will be useful to European food standards agencies in that it furthers our understanding of 
entrepreneurial practice and morality in the food industry. Overall it helps to better 
understand the criminal enterpreneurial practices involved and how they are linked to 
business models. Business model frameworks can be adapted on a case-by-case basis 
depending on the type of fraud committed by different criminal actors, which can in turn 
be used as an investigative tool by the various agencies involved. These models can be 
used to help detect and potentially disrupt the criminal enterprises. The applied model 
synthesises practical knowledge thus facilitating the transfer of knowledge process 
between academia, the food industry and the investigative and regulatory agencies 
involved. It helps us collapse differential boundaries to knowledge sharing by mapping and 
authoring a shared knowledge base and lexicon, whilst also disseminating the 
transformative knowledge to the academic and practitioner communities. This study begins 
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the process of developing a theoretically informed conceptual ‘business model’ for 
understanding food-fraud whilst synthesising academic and practical knowledge. 
From an academic perspective there are obvious implications. Firstly, there is still a 
dearth of academic research and there are few policy-related studies into the pernicious 
issue of food fraud. It may take fatal consequences for it to be given more serious 
consideration. Secondly, there is the difficulty in obtaining data because of access to such 
enterprises and entrepreneurs. Moreover, academics are still reliant on documentary 
sources of evidence and on journalistic investigative reporting and there are obvious legal 
implications of overstepping the boundaries of reporting the truth.
There are distinct policy implications from this work, in particular the need to legislate 
not only against international criminal conspiracies, but also the everyday ordinary 
organized food frauds perpetuated.  Low penalties do little to prevent such crimes which 
need to be taken more seriously by the authorities, and in some instances treated as major 
crime. Moreover, in formulating food laws, rules and regulations, greater cognizance 
should be taken to consider how supply chains in the food industry could be better protected 
from predatory criminal actions. There are also practical implications and outputs, in 
particular our adaption and development of an investigative framework based to cover 
illegal business models. 
What the research has shown is that the criminal activities of ostensibly legitimate 
business owners impact seriously on the industry but because they operate in a legitimate 
entrepreneurial arena can slip between the intelligence agencies and the police intelligence 
gathering apparatus. On this account there is a need for a greater intelligence gathering 
exercise to combat food fraud, whilst initiating greater and more coordinated multi-agency 
training in investigating organized food fraud. It is clear that the cases discussed constitute 
continuing criminal and entrepreneurial ventures committed by a small but significant 
number of criminals operating to illegally circumvent the legitimate supply chain and thus 
increase their profits. This makes it of interest to supply chain scholars and food industry 
practitioners. The repeated criminal acts of such industry insiders constitute a continuing 
conspiracy. 
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